Wiseway Group.
A small freight and e-commerce logistics company growing profit on a low multiple. The catch is size, concentration and a thin market.
A$0.255 (last trade, 30 October 2026) · Market cap about A$43.9m (BG Trading estimate) · 30 October 2026
The story in 60 seconds.
A cheap, cash-generating freight stock with fast e-commerce growth, held back by two customers worth 31% of revenue and a market where buyers and sellers are 12% apart. Tap any card to jump to the detail.
Freight, plus the online shopping boom.
FY26 revenue, up 10.1% (13.0% excluding last year’s one-off).
Wiseway Group (ASX: WWG) is an Australian international freight forwarder and logistics provider. It runs two main businesses: Global Forwarding (WGF), which moves exports (including perishables) and imports, and eCommerce Solutions (WES), which handles fulfilment and delivery for online sellers. It also operates overseas divisions in New Zealand, the United States and Singapore. The website describes more than 20 years of experience, 11 branch locations, a team of more than 300 and shipping to more than 100 destinations. [Reported fact: FY26 annual report; company website, figures as stated by the company]
FY26 revenue was A$205.6m. Australia and New Zealand produced A$170.4m (83%), the United States A$33.4m (16%) and Singapore A$1.7m (1%). China no longer generates external revenue and is now a lean operational support hub. [Reported fact]
Why now
Wiseway reported FY26 on 27 August 2026 and the shares have drifted from about A$0.34 in July to A$0.255, a level that sits on the 250 day average. The price is about 32% below the February high of about A$0.375 (chart reading) and up more than fourfold from the 2023 lows. The 52 week range is A$0.20 to A$0.38. [Chart reading and Simply Wall St range; drawdown is a BG Trading calculation]
What the market may be missing
At A$0.255 the shares trade on 9.2x FY26 earnings with a free cash flow yield of 11% after lease payments (17% before them), a return on equity of about 19% and a 4.7% fully franked dividend. The company also owns a property at Chipping Norton, held at A$10.75m in the accounts against a bank valuation of A$18.6m, a gap of A$7.85m or about 18% of the market value (BG Trading calculation, bank valuation only, not tax adjusted). [Reported fact and calculation]
What the market may be pricing correctly: two e-commerce customers account for 31% of revenue, margins are thin, the stock is small and illiquid, and the share register is highly concentrated (detail in the VIP area).
Competitive advantage
Rating: NARROW, confidence LOW. [Inference]
- Integration with e-commerce customers (fulfilment, last mile) creates some switching cost. [Inference]
- Established perishable export lanes and 11 branch locations give it a network that new entrants would need time to build.
- Revenue has grown from A$112.3m to A$205.6m in two years, a 35.3% compound rate, with profit before tax growing faster. [Reported fact]
- Freight forwarding is competitive and largely commoditised, and EBITDA margin is only 7.1%.
- Two customers account for 31% of revenue, so one lost contract would change the story.
- Market share, contract lengths and patents: not disclosed in the sources we could read.
Profit is growing faster than sales.
FY26 profit before tax, on revenue growth of 10.1%.
Profit grew faster than revenue: revenue +10.1%, EBITDA +9.2%, profit before tax +21.9%. The headline NPAT dipped 4.9% only because FY25 included a one-off A$2.0m tax benefit, and on the company’s normalised numbers it grew about 60%. We rate earnings quality MODERATE: cash flow is about twice profit, but margins are thin and the tax line is noisy. [Inference]
Look at the margin: EBITDA of 7.1% and NPAT of 2.3% of revenue mean a small slip in freight rates or a lost contract moves profit a lot. That is the core risk in the numbers.
| Metric | FY26 (30 Jun 2026) | FY25 | Change | Read |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | A$205.6m | A$186.7m | +10.1% | Underlying +13.0% (FY25 included A$4.8m non-recurring US revenue) |
| EBITDA | A$14.7m | A$13.4m | +9.2% | 7.1% margin (FY25: 7.2%) |
| EBIT | A$7.7m | A$6.9m | +11.4% | 3.7% margin (our calculation) |
| Profit before tax | A$5.9m | A$4.8m | +21.9% | Interest costs fell as the average loan rate dropped from 6.86% to 5.18% |
| Reported NPAT | A$4.8m | A$5.0m | -4.9% | FY25 included a A$2.0m one-off deferred tax benefit |
| Normalised NPAT | A$4.8m | A$3.0m | +59.9% | Company non-IFRS figure, unaudited |
| EPS (basic) | 2.76c | 2.63c | +4.9% | Share count rose 2.9% |
| Operating cash flow | A$9.7m | A$9.7m | flat | Cash conversion about 2.0x NPAT (our calculation) |
| Capex (property, plant, equipment) | A$2.4m | A$1.4m | n/a | Light capital needs |
| Free cash flow (OCF less capex) | A$7.3m | A$8.2m | n/a | A$5.0m after lease payments of A$2.3m (our calculation) |
| ROE (average equity) | 19.1% | n/a | n/a | BG Trading calculation |
| ROIC (estimate) | 13% | n/a | n/a | EBIT x 70% / (equity + net debt incl. leases). Assumes 30% tax |
| Dividends per share | 1.2c fully franked | 1.0c | +20% | Payout about 43% of NPAT (our calculation) |
Sources: Wiseway FY26 annual report and results presentation (27 August 2026). Margins, ROE, ROIC, free cash flow and payout are BG Trading calculations. No quarterly data is published, so a quarterly trend is not shown.
Cash covers the bank.
Cash at 30 June 2026, against A$15.8m of bank loans and A$17.8m of leases.
Cash was A$19.1m at 30 June 2026, up from A$14.5m. Secured bank loans were A$15.8m (flat) at a weighted average rate of 5.18%, and lease liabilities were A$17.8m. Net assets were A$26.4m. Cash covers the bank debt, so on bank debt alone Wiseway holds net cash of A$3.3m. Including leases, net debt is A$14.5m, about 1.0x EBITDA. [Reported fact; net figures are BG Trading calculations]
The loans are secured over the group’s land, buildings and vehicles, have no covenants and run to October 2028. The bank has valued the Chipping Norton property at A$18.6m. Interest cover is about 4.2x (EBIT over net finance costs, our calculation). Receivables are A$26.9m, about 48 days of revenue, so customer credit is the main working-capital risk (the company lists it as a key risk). [Reported fact and calculation]
- Cash exceeds bank loans, with no covenants and a maturity in October 2028.
- Operating cash flow of A$9.7m comfortably covers capex of A$2.4m and dividends of A$2.1m.
- Lease commitments total A$20.2m, with A$6.7m due within one year.
- Share count rose 2.9% in FY26 and 7.5m performance rights are outstanding (about 4% more shares if all vest). [Reported fact and calculation]
- Undrawn facilities: none reported. Funding is a listed risk, so any large acquisition would likely need new capital.
E-commerce is doing the heavy lifting.
eCommerce Solutions revenue growth, a 72% compound rate over two years.
The growth engine is eCommerce Solutions: revenue of A$89.2m, up 22.2% on A$73.0m and a 72% compound rate over two years (from A$30.2m in FY24). It is now 43% of group revenue. Global Forwarding grew only 1.7% to A$69.9m, as strong volume growth was offset by lower freight rates. The overseas divisions grew 2.1% to A$44.5m. [Reported fact]
The United States reported flat revenue (A$33.4m), but excluding last year’s one-off A$4.8m revenue, underlying US growth was 18.3%. Profitability improved in both halves and Wiseway regained 100% ownership. Singapore fell 19.2%. [Reported fact]
- eCommerce Solutions growing at 22% and the largest single division.
- Management expects continued e-commerce growth, expansion of third-party logistics and fulfilment, and US momentum.
- Two customers, both e-commerce businesses, account for A$63.7m of revenue (31%, up from 28% last year). Growth is therefore partly a bet on those customers. [Reported fact]
- Export growth is expected to moderate, and freight rates are cutting forwarding revenue.
Backlog Coverage: not disclosed. Wiseway reports no order book or contracted revenue figure. We classify growth as ACCELERATING IN E-COMMERCE, STEADY OVERALL.
More of the same would be enough.
Our base case FY27 revenue, about 8% above FY26.
FY26 is fully reported, so this is the FY27 projection. All three scenarios are BG Trading estimates. Management gave no numerical guidance. It said last year’s non-recurring revenue is fully cycled and expects moderated export growth, continued e-commerce growth, 3PL expansion and US momentum. [Management guidance: qualitative only. Analyst consensus: none current]
| Scenario | FY27 revenue | FY27 EBIT | Assumption | EV / EBIT used |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | A$206m (flat) | A$6.8m (-11%) | Freight rates stay low, one large customer scales back, margin slips | 4.5x |
| Base | A$222m (+8%) | A$8.4m (+9%) | E-commerce grows mid-teens, forwarding flat, US momentum, margins steady | 6.0x |
| Bull | A$234m (+14%) | A$10.0m (+30%) | E-commerce and 3PL expand, operating leverage lifts the EBIT margin to about 4.3% | 7.5x |
Our base case needs revenue growth of 8%, slightly below FY26, and a small improvement in EBIT. We rate it MODERATE EXECUTION RISK. The base multiple of 6.0x is the CTI Logistics level (5.9x). The bull case sits between CTI and K&S.
Beyond FY27
We have not modelled FY28. The only broker on record, PAC Partners, carries an old A$0.66 target that appears to date from 2022, so we treat it as stale and do not use it. [Analyst consensus: not available]
Macro and industry
Macro: NEUTRAL, with trade policy and tariffs a swing factor for the US business and export volumes. Industry: COMPETITIVE, WITH STRUCTURAL E-COMMERCE GROWTH. The variable that matters most is whether the two large customers keep growing volume with Wiseway. [Inference]
Cheap on the numbers.
Price to earnings on FY26 NPAT, with a 4.7% fully franked dividend yield.
| Metric | Value | Working |
|---|---|---|
| Market cap | A$43.9m | A$0.255 x 172.1m shares (30 Jun 2026 count; BG Trading estimate) |
| Enterprise value (excl. leases) | A$40.6m | Market cap less A$3.3m net cash on bank debt |
| Enterprise value (incl. leases) | A$58.4m | Adds A$17.8m of lease liabilities |
| EV / Revenue | 0.20x | 0.28x including leases |
| EV / EBITDA (incl. leases) | 4.0x | A$58.4m / A$14.7m |
| EV / EBIT (excl. leases) | 5.3x | A$40.6m / A$7.7m |
| P/E | 9.2x | A$43.9m / A$4.8m. 14.6x on FY25 normalised NPAT of A$3.0m |
| Forward P/E | not sourced | No consensus EPS |
| P/S | 0.21x | A$43.9m / A$205.6m |
| P/B | 1.7x | A$43.9m / A$26.4m net assets |
| PEG | n/m | EPS grew 4.9% reported; not meaningful |
| FCF yield | 16.7% | (A$9.7m – A$2.4m) / A$43.9m. 11.4% after lease payments |
| Dividend yield | 4.7% | 1.2c / A$0.255 fully franked, about 6.7% with franking credits (30% tax) |
We classify the valuation as CHEAP, WITH A LIQUIDITY DISCOUNT. A P/E of 9x, an EV/EBIT of 5x and a double-digit free cash flow yield are low for a business growing revenue at 10% or more. A discount is fair for a A$44m company with concentrated customers and a thin market, but the gap looks wide. [Inference]
Peer comparison is in section 8.
The half year is the next test.
The half year result (forecast date) will show whether e-commerce growth is holding.
| Horizon | Catalyst | Rating | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 to 3 months | Freight rate and tariff news, e-commerce peak season volumes (Nov to Dec) | MEDIUM | Ongoing |
| 3 to 6 months | Half year result (24 February 2027, forecast date, to verify) and interim dividend | HIGH | Confirmed event, date to verify |
| 6 to 12 months | US momentum after regaining 100% ownership, 3PL and fulfilment expansion, any new anchor customer | MEDIUM | Speculative |
| 12 to 24 months | Re-rating from broker coverage, a higher margin mix, or a property monetisation (bank valuation A$18.6m) | MEDIUM | Speculative |
| Risk | Probability | Impact | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fundamental | Medium | High | Thin margins: EBITDA 7.1%, NPAT 2.3% of revenue |
| Valuation | Low | Medium | P/E 9x already low, so downside is mainly about earnings |
| Technical | Medium | Medium | Price sits on the 250 day average after lower highs since February |
| Financial | Low | Medium | Cash exceeds bank loans, no covenants, loan to October 2028 |
| Execution | Medium | High | Two customers are 31% of revenue; losing one would hit profit |
| Industry | Medium | Medium | Freight rates are cutting forwarding revenue; export growth to moderate |
| Macro | Medium | Medium | Tariffs and trade policy affect the US business (16% of revenue) |
| Governance | Medium | Medium | A concentrated register and founder control; details are in the VIP area |
| Liquidity | High | High | Bid A$0.23 against offer A$0.26 on 30 October, a spread of about 12%; small volumes |
| Dilution | Low | Low | Shares +2.9% in FY26; 7.5m performance rights outstanding |
Greatest risk of permanent capital loss: the loss of one of the two large e-commerce customers combined with a freight rate squeeze, because thin margins turn a small revenue loss into a large profit loss, and the thin market makes it hard to exit. [Inference]
Priced like its closest peer.
EV to EBIT: Wiseway against CTI Logistics and K&S.
Figures are for the year to 30 June 2026. Net debt excludes lease liabilities so all three are on the same basis; EV is market cap plus that net debt (a BG Trading estimate). CTI market cap is from Simply Wall St (26 October) and its EBITDA and EBIT include lease depreciation, as does Wiseway’s. K&S price is from 8 September and shares are implied from market cap, and its lease liabilities were not found. Confidence: Wiseway high, CTI medium, K&S low to medium.
| Company | FY end | Price | Market cap | Net debt (excl. leases) | EV | Revenue | EBITDA | EBIT | NPAT | EV / Revenue | EV / EBIT | P/E | Analyst view |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wiseway (WWG) | 30 Jun 26 | A$0.255 (30 Oct) | A$43.9m | -A$3.3m | A$40.6m | A$205.6m | A$14.7m | A$7.7m | A$4.8m | 0.20x | 5.3x | 9.2x | No current cover |
| CTI Logistics (CLX) | 30 Jun 26 | A$2.78 (26 Oct) | A$216.0m | A$36.0m | A$252.0m | A$357.1m | A$76.4m | A$42.9m | A$24.0m | 0.71x | 5.9x | 9.0x | Not sourced |
| K&S (KSC) | 30 Jun 26 | A$3.11 (8 Sep, stale) | A$425.6m | A$55.8m | A$481.4m | A$729.2m | A$81.6m | A$37.9m | A$22.8m | 0.66x | 12.7x | 18.7x | Not sourced |
Growth and profit. Revenue growth was 10.1% at Wiseway, 9.7% at CTI and -2.1% at K&S. NPAT growth was -4.9% reported (about +60% normalised) at Wiseway, +68.9% at CTI and -22.0% at K&S. EBITDA margin is 7.1% at Wiseway, 21.4% at CTI and 11.2% at K&S. NPAT margin is 2.3%, 6.7% and 3.1% (BG Trading calculations).
Multiple against growth. Wiseway trades about level with CTI on P/E (9.2x against 9.0x) and about 10% below it on EV/EBIT, even though CTI earns a 12% EBIT margin against Wiseway’s 3.7%. Against K&S, Wiseway is about 51% cheaper on P/E and 58% cheaper on EV/EBIT, though K&S is a much larger company with a falling profit. [BG Trading calculation]
The most important difference: Wiseway has the lowest margins and the smallest scale of the three, so part of its discount to K&S is earned.
Is (ASX: WWG) Wiseway Group Limited, undervalued or overvalued in comparison to its peers?
FAIRLY VALUED versus peers, with a modest valuation gap in Wiseway’s favour. [Inference]
- About level with CTI on P/E and about 10% cheaper on EV/EBIT, with a similar revenue growth rate.
- Roughly half the P/E and EV/EBIT of K&S.
- Margins of 3.7% EBIT against 12.0% at CTI and 5.2% at K&S explain why the multiple is low.
- The K&S price is seven weeks old, and no peer has current broker coverage in our sources.
The discount to K&S looks mostly earned by size, margins and concentration. Against CTI, which is the closer comparison, Wiseway looks fairly priced, not mispriced.
Sitting right on support.
RSI is neutral and price rests on the rising 250 day average.
- Trend and moving averages. Price is A$0.255, about 4% above the rising 250 day average (near A$0.245) and level with the 9 and 40 day averages (near A$0.25 to A$0.26), which have converged. The long-term trend is up: price is more than four times its 2023 low. Since February the highs have been getting lower (about A$0.355, then A$0.34, then A$0.285), so the medium-term picture is a drift back to the long-term average. We classify structure as CONSOLIDATING AT SUPPORT.
- Support and resistance. Support: the 250 day average near A$0.245, then the October and August lows near A$0.225 to A$0.23. Resistance: about A$0.28 to A$0.29 (September and early August), A$0.32 to A$0.34 (July and March), and the February high near A$0.355 to A$0.375.
- RSI. At about 50 it is neutral. It dipped to around 30 in October at the low and has recovered. There is no divergence to report.
- Failed breakdown. In October price dipped below the 250 day average (a wick to about A$0.225) and closed back above it. A failed breakdown at long-term support is a classic early reversal sign.
- Volume. The latest bar is about 480,000 shares, several times a normal day on this chart, and it is an up bar. In absolute terms that is only about A$120,000, so the volume is thin.
- Spread and liquidity. On 30 October the screen showed a bid of A$0.23 and an offer of A$0.26, a spread of about 12% around the A$0.255 last trade. In a stock this thin, an entry and exit cost can be larger than a normal stop. This is a trading risk on its own.
Probability view
Qualitative judgment from the chart structure, not statistical forecasts.
BGS 20 VIEW: Watchlist.
Positioning: This area is only available for VIP Members, click here to Subscribe.
Cheap. But not easy to buy.
BGS 20 Score. Business Quality 63, Setup Quality 58.
A good company, a good stock and a good entry are three different questions.
BGS 20 Score: 62/100 (Business Quality 63, Setup Quality 58). The two sub-scores are close. This is a decent, growing small company at a low price, in a setup that has not yet confirmed and carries real liquidity risk.
| Category | Score | Weight | Weighted |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fundamentals | 62 | 15% | 9.30 |
| Growth | 66 | 10% | 6.60 |
| Balance sheet | 68 | 10% | 6.80 |
| Valuation | 74 | 20% | 14.80 |
| Technical | 48 | 10% | 4.80 |
| Catalysts | 50 | 10% | 5.00 |
| Industry and macro | 55 | 10% | 5.50 |
| Risk / reward (assessed in VIP) | 50 | 15% | 7.50 |
| Subtotal | 100% | 60.30 | |
| Reversal Watch (one signal) | +2.00 | ||
| BGS 20 Score | 62.3, rounded to 62 |
Working: Business Quality = (62×15 + 66×10 + 68×10 + 55×10) / 45 = 62.7. Setup Quality = (74×20 + 48×10 + 50×10 + 50×15) / 55 = 58.4. No cap applied. Reversal Watch adds 2 points for one signal (the failed breakdown under the 250 day average) and comes off once the pattern is confirmed or fails. Biggest factor lifting the score: valuation. Biggest factor lowering it: technical structure and the unproven risk/reward.
Bull, base and bear cases
| Case | Fair value per share | Assumption |
|---|---|---|
| Bear | A$0.20 | FY27 EBIT A$6.8m at 4.5x EV/EBIT, plus net cash of A$3.3m, over 172.1m shares |
| Base | A$0.31 | FY27 EBIT A$8.4m at 6.0x (the CTI Logistics level) |
| Bull | A$0.46 | FY27 EBIT A$10.0m at 7.5x |
Fair value uses FY27 EBIT scenarios (BG Trading estimates) at an EV/EBIT multiple on the same basis as the peers (excluding leases), plus net cash, divided by 172.1m shares. It is a qualitative range, not a price target. Current price vs base fair value: (0.312 – 0.255) / 0.255 = +22%.
| Item | Detail |
|---|---|
| Company | Wiseway Group Limited |
| Ticker | ASX: WWG |
| Price | A$0.255 (30 Oct 2026, last trade) |
| Market cap | About A$43.9m (BG Trading estimate) |
| BGS 20 level | Technically at the 250 day average, about 4% above it and 32% below the February high |
| Long-term fair value (base) | A$0.31 (BG Trading estimate, not a price target) |
| Upside to fair value | +22% |
| Bull / bear probability | 40% holds and rebuilds / 30% loses the average (qualitative) |
| Rating | WAIT |
Why WAIT: a Watchlist rating needs Business Quality of 65 or more and ours is 63. A Speculative Buy needs a setup that meets our risk limits, which cannot be shown until an entry is set, and with a 12% spread any stop is hard to place. The rating can move once a setup is defined and confirmed.
Buy at the current price? Sign up for VIP membership to see this part.
- Biggest reason to own: 9x earnings, a 17% free cash flow yield, net cash on the bank debt and 22% e-commerce growth.
- Biggest reason not to own: two customers are 31% of revenue and the stock is so thinly traded that getting in and out can cost 12%.
What invalidates the thesis: a lost e-commerce customer, a half year profit decline, or a clean break below the October lows. The exact chart levels are in the VIP area.
Single most important catalyst: the half year result (forecast 24 February 2027). Main driver: e-commerce volumes and customer concentration. Asymmetric risk/reward: assessed in the VIP area. Discounted? Yes, on earnings and cash flow. Trade or long-term: a speculative small-cap position for a patient holder, not a core holding.
The dip under the line did not hold.
In October Wiseway slipped below its 250 day average and was bought straight back above it, and the latest bar came on several times normal volume. That is a failed breakdown at long-term support.
It is a watch flag, not a buy signal, in a stock where a handful of trades move the price. We want to see it hold and build higher lows first.
SHOULD I BUY (ASX: WWG) NOW?
ENTRY DETAILS, TRADING CONSIDERATIONS, TARGETS, SHAREHOLDER STATISTICS, HOLDING TREND (VIP AREA)
VIP Members only. Our entry price, targets, stop loss and shareholder statistics are for VIP Members.
Sources
Wiseway Group FY26 annual report and Appendix 4E (ASX announcements, 27 August 2026) and FY26 results presentation (27 August 2026); Wiseway website (wiseway.com.au); Market Index and Simply Wall St (share price, market cap, shareholder notices, insider trades and analyst coverage); CTI Logistics 2026 annual report and results release (ctilogistics.com); K&S Corporation FY26 results (ASX announcement, via Listcorp). Chart supplied by BG Trading (30 October 2026).
Figures marked as BG Trading estimates are our calculations and may differ from other sources. Share prices are from the dates shown and have moved. The Wiseway price is the last trade on 30 October 2026 in a thinly traded stock. Peer prices are older and are flagged in section 8.
Disclaimer. The information contained in this report is provided by BG Trading Australia (ACN 161943228, License 4901880) for general informational purposes only and does not constitute personal financial product advice. It has been prepared without taking into account your objectives, financial situation, needs, or risk tolerance, and should not be relied upon as a substitute for independent professional advice tailored to your circumstances. Nothing in this report constitutes an offer, solicitation, or recommendation to buy, sell, or hold any financial product.
All technical levels, targets, and commentary reflect a point-in-time interpretation of publicly available chart data and are inherently speculative; markets are volatile and unpredictable, and no methodology, including the BGS 20 framework, can guarantee any particular outcome. Past performance is not, and should not be treated as, an indicator of future performance. To the maximum extent permitted by law, BG Trading Australia, its directors, employees, and agents disclaim all liability, whether direct or indirect, for any loss or damage arising from reliance on this report, including any errors, omissions, or inaccuracies in the information provided, and any decision made or action taken on the basis of it. You acknowledge that trading and investing carry inherent risk, including the risk of loss of capital, and that you act on this information entirely at your own discretion and risk. BG Trading recommends you obtain independent, licensed financial and taxation advice before making any investment decision.
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