ASX: TPW
Temple & Webster.
Down 84% from the high, debt free and guiding to 50 to 80% EBITDA growth. The selling has stopped. Has the trend turned?
A$5.43 | +33.4% on 23 October | Market cap ~A$624m
Summary
The story in 60 seconds.
A record-revenue online retailer with no debt, a thin margin and a new strategy that trades sales for profit. Tap any card to jump to the detail.
1 · Company overview
The online home of Australian furniture.
Active customers, and A$665m of record revenue in FY26.
NARROW MOATTemple & Webster is Australia’s largest online-only furniture and homewares retailer, and by its own measure the number two specialty retailer in the category by wallet share Management claim. It sells about 200,000 products across furniture, homewares, home improvement (The Build) and a Trade & Commercial arm. Roughly half of revenue now comes from exclusive and private label ranges, with the rest drop-shipped directly by suppliers, which keeps the model asset light Reported fact.
FY26 was a record year on the top line: revenue of A$664.6m (+10.6%) and EBITDA of A$21.9m (+16.6%), with about 1.3m active customers and A$122.7m of cash and no debt after a A$30m buy-back Reported fact. The share price tells a different story. The stock peaked near A$28.50 in August 2025 and fell about 84% to a low near A$4.07, as revenue growth stalled, statutory NPAT fell 62% to A$4.3m and early FY27 trading came in 13% below the prior year Reported fact.
Why investors care now: at the 23 October 2026 AGM, management said trading had improved (the run-rate decline narrowed from -13% to about -4%), contribution margin dollars were up 16% year to date and FY27 EBITDA guidance of A$33m to A$40m was reaffirmed. The stock jumped 33.4% in one session on heavy volume Reported fact. New CEO Susie Sugden (from 1 July 2026) is moving the business away from heavy discounting and entry-level ranges toward the mass-mid market, where the company says over 75% of industry profit sits Management claim.
What the market may be underestimating: a debt-free balance sheet with about 20% of the market cap in cash, and margin gains that are already visible in contribution dollars. What it may be overestimating: how quickly revenue returns to growth. Management itself does not expect positive comparisons until late February 2027, and double-digit growth is only targeted from FY28 Management guidance.
Competitive advantage
Rating: NARROW, confidence MEDIUM Inference
- Scale online: the clear online leader in the category, with A$665m of revenue, 1.3m active customers and 62% of orders from repeat customers Reported fact.
- Exclusive product: about 51% of revenue from exclusive ranges (up from 45%) and over 80% of the top 500 products exclusive, which reduces direct price comparison Reported fact.
- Cost position: fixed costs fell from 12% to 10% of revenue over three years, an edge over store-based rivals with rent-heavy cost bases Reported fact.
- Data and AI: a large first-party data set across millions of shopping journeys, with early AI results such as +56% conversion on AI-powered recommendations Management claim.
- No pricing power yet in the numbers: EBITDA margin is just 3.3% and revenue fell as soon as promotional intensity was reduced Reported fact.
- Low switching costs: furniture is an infrequent purchase and customers can easily compare against Amazon, Kmart, IKEA and specialty chains Inference.
2 · Fundamentals & earnings quality
Sales up. Profit down.
Record revenue, but a 3.3% EBITDA margin leaves little for shareholders.
MODERATE QUALITY| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | Change | Read |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | A$664.6m | A$600.7m | +10.6% | Record, but driven by H1; H2 was weaker Reported fact |
| Delivered margin | A$201.0m (30.2%) | A$190.5m (31.7%) | +5.5% 🚩 | Grew slower than revenue, so margin % fell (discounting) Reported fact |
| Gross margin | Not disclosed in the material reviewed | Delivered margin is the company’s headline margin | ||
| EBITDA (statutory) | A$21.9m (3.3%) | A$18.8m (3.1%) | +16.6% | Thin margin for a A$665m retailer Reported fact |
| EBITDA (underlying, ex FX and one-offs) | A$25.9m (3.9%) | A$20.2m (3.4%) | +28.0% | Excludes NZ start-up (A$2.4m), warehouse move and FX Reported fact |
| EBIT | Not disclosed in the material reviewed | D&A rose, per the result commentary | ||
| Statutory NPAT | A$4.3m | ~A$11.3m | -62% 🚩 | Higher tax and D&A; FY25 back-calculated Reported fact / BG est. |
| EPS (statutory) | ~3.7c | ~9.5c | -61% 🚩 | NPAT / ~116m to 119m shares BG Trading estimate |
| Operating cash flow | A$24m | Not disclosed | n/a | Converts above NPAT, helped by D&A Reported fact |
| Free cash flow | Capex not disclosed in the material reviewed | Company says operating and free cash flow are positive Management claim | ||
| Cash | A$122.7m | A$144.3m | -15% 🚩 | Fall explained by the A$30m buy-back Reported fact |
| Debt / Net cash | Nil / A$122.7m | Nil / A$144.3m | -A$21.6m | Debt free Reported fact |
| ROE | ~2 to 3% | n/a | n/a | Low; equity is mostly cash BG Trading estimate |
| Active customers / revenue per customer | ~1.3m / A$494 | ~1.24m / ~A$457 | +5% / +8% | Customers spending more per head Reported fact |
| Adjacencies (Home improvement + Trade) | A$117m | ~A$90m | +30% | Fastest-growing segment Reported fact |
Earnings quality: MODERATE Inference. Growth is organic and repeat-customer driven, and operating cash flow (A$24m) was well above NPAT (A$4.3m). Against that, delivered margin % fell as revenue was bought with promotions, statutory profit dropped 62%, and the “underlying” figures exclude costs (NZ start-up, FX) that will recur in some form. The quality of FY27 earnings depends on margin gains holding while revenue shrinks in 1H.
3 · Balance sheet
Cash in the bank. No debt.
About 20% of the market cap sits in cash.
VERY STRONGCash of A$122.7m at 30 June 2026 and no borrowings Reported fact. Cash equals about 20% of the current market cap. The company spent A$30m on buy-backs in FY26, has cancelled 12.4m shares since 2023 (over A$70m returned) and was still buying in October 2026 at about A$4.26 to A$4.30 Reported fact. Lease liabilities for warehouses exist but are not quantified in the material reviewed Not disclosed.
Capex needs are light: the model is drop-ship and third-party logistics heavy, with technology and AI spending funded within guidance Management guidance. With positive operating cash flow, there is no burn, no runway issue and no realistic need to raise equity.
Balance sheet: VERY STRONG Inference. Dilution risk is low, and the buy-back is shrinking the share count.
4 · Growth & pipeline
Shrinking, on purpose.
Revenue year to date, while contribution margin dollars are up 16%.
CONTRACTINGSTABILISINGPast: revenue grew from A$497.8m (FY24) to A$664.6m (FY26), about 15.5% a year Reported fact. Current: checkout revenue is down 8% for 1 July to 19 October 2026, improving from -13% in August to about -4% in the most recent period, as the company deliberately cut promotional depth Reported fact. Contribution margin dollars are up 16% over the same period, so the business is earning more on less revenue Reported fact.
Growth: CONTRACTING (by choice), with early signs of stabilising Inference. Drivers of a return to growth: lapping heavy promotions from late February 2027, the national brand campaign (Brisbane test: +7% revenue and +11% traffic against control markets), private label (linen test: +8% revenue, +11% delivered margin), adjacencies (A$117m, +30%) and New Zealand Management guidance / Reported fact.
There is no order book. Online penetration is the structural tailwind: 20% in Australia against 29% in the UK and 35% in the US Management claim, Euromonitor. Test results are early, short-period and self-reported, so we treat them as encouraging, not proven.
5 · Outlook
The year of the margin.
Base-case FY27 EBITDA, the guidance midpoint, up 67% on FY26.
REQUIRES STRONG EXECUTIONFY27 Projection
FY26 is fully reported, so we project FY27 (year to 30 June 2027).
| FY27 | Bear | Base | Bull |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | A$610m (-8%) | A$645m (-3%) | A$680m (+2%) |
| EBITDA | A$30m (4.9%) | A$36.5m (5.7%) | A$40m (5.9%) |
| Assumption | Revenue stays negative through 2H; margin gains partly given back to defend sales | Guidance midpoint; return to growth from March | Faster 2H recovery as brand campaign and private label scale |
Management guidance: EBITDA A$33m to A$40m. Analyst consensus: average target about A$5.71 across 14 analysts (StockAnalysis, September 2026, low confidence). Scenarios: BG Trading estimate.
Implied requirement: REQUIRES STRONG EXECUTION Inference. To reach A$33m to A$40m, EBITDA must lift 50% to 80% while revenue is falling in 1H. The YTD data supports it (contribution margin dollars +16%), and growth costs are funded inside the range, but there is little room for a weak Christmas period.
Beyond FY27 BG Trading estimate: if revenue returns to double-digit growth in FY28 as targeted and the EBITDA margin moves toward 6% to 7%, FY28 EBITDA of A$45m to A$55m is possible. That is a target, not guidance.
Macro: NEGATIVE. Australian discretionary spending is soft and big-ticket furniture is among the first purchases households delay. Industry: MATURE overall, with online share still growing. The single most important variable is the Christmas and January trading period: whether revenue keeps narrowing toward zero while margins hold.
6 · Valuation
Expensive today. Fair tomorrow.
The price accepts the margin story, not the growth story.
FAIR VALUE| Metric | Value | Working / read |
|---|---|---|
| Market cap | ~A$624m | ~115m shares x A$5.43 BG Trading estimate |
| Enterprise value | ~A$501m | A$624m + nil debt – A$123m cash (pre-lease) BG Trading estimate |
| EV / Revenue | 0.75x | A$501m / A$664.6m |
| EV / EBITDA (FY26) | 22.9x | A$501m / A$21.9m: expensive on trailing |
| EV / EBITDA (FY27 guide midpoint) | 13.7x | A$501m / A$36.5m: reasonable if delivered |
| P/E (FY26 statutory) | ~145x | A$624m / A$4.3m: not meaningful for valuation |
| P/S | 0.94x | A$624m / A$664.6m |
| FCF yield | Not calculated, capex not disclosed in the material reviewed | |
| Dividend yield | Nil | Capital returned by buy-back |
Valuation: FAIR VALUE Inference. Trailing earnings make the stock look expensive, but on FY27 guidance it trades at about 13.7x EBITDA, and below 1x sales with 20% of the market cap in cash. The price implies the market accepts most of the FY27 margin story but gives little credit for a return to revenue growth. See section 8 for how this compares with peers.
7 · Catalysts & risk
February decides it.
1H FY27 result, and the first month of positive revenue comparisons.
HIGH RISK| Horizon | Catalyst | Status | Rating |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 to 3 months | Black Friday and Christmas trading; ongoing buy-back | Confirmed (buy-back), outcome unknown | HIGH |
| 3 to 6 months | 1H FY27 result (February 2027); return to positive revenue comparisons from late February | Confirmed timing, management expectation | VERY HIGH |
| 6 to 12 months | FY27 result vs A$33m to A$40m guidance; NZ AI-led site launch | Guidance, partly speculative | HIGH |
| 12 to 24 months | Double-digit revenue growth from FY28; new market entry; possible M&A | Speculative | MODERATE |
| Risk | Detail | Probability | Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fundamental | Revenue does not recover once promotions are lapped | Medium | High 🚩 |
| Valuation | Trailing multiples are high if guidance slips | Medium | Medium |
| Technical | Primary downtrend intact; price far below the 200-day average | High | Medium |
| Financial | Debt free, A$123m cash | Low | Low |
| Execution | New CEO, range overhaul, national brand roll-out at once | Medium | Medium |
| Industry | Amazon, Kmart, Temu and specialty chains competing on price | High | Medium |
| Macro | Weak big-ticket discretionary spending | High | High 🚩 |
| Governance | Co-founder moved from CEO to Executive Chair; lead independent director added | Low | Low |
| Dilution | Buy-back reducing share count | Low | Low |
8 · Peers comparison
Cheapest on sales. Dearest on profit.
Margin is the single biggest gap between TPW and its peers.
FAIRLY VALUEDPeers: Kogan.com (ASX: KGN, online retail), Nick Scali (ASX: NCK, furniture) and Lovisa (ASX: LOV, specialty retail, a quality benchmark rather than a direct competitor). All have June year ends Reported fact.
| Company | FY26 revenue | Rev. growth | FY26 EBITDA | FY26 NPAT | Net cash / (debt) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TPW | A$664.6m | +10.6% | A$21.9m (3.3%) | A$4.3m | A$122.7m |
| KGN | A$510.7m | +4.6% | A$41.8m adj. (8.2%) | A$11.2m | A$36.4m |
| NCK | A$516.7m | +4.3% | A$180.7m (35%, incl. leases) | A$75.7m | (A$243m) incl. leases |
| LOV | A$938m | +17.6% | EBIT A$158.2m (16.9%) | A$95.6m | (A$40m) |
Reported fact: company FY26 results (TPW 19 Aug, KGN 24 Aug, NCK 7 Aug, LOV 26 Aug 2026). FY25 and three-year history for peers not fully sourced. NCK EBITDA includes AASB 16 lease add-backs, so its margin is not comparable with TPW’s.
| Company | Price (date) | Mkt cap | EV | EV/Revenue | EV/EBITDA | Analyst view |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| TPW | A$5.43 (23 Oct) | ~A$624m | ~A$501m | 0.75x | 22.9x (13.7x FY27 guide) | Avg target ~A$5.71, Buy, 14 analysts (+5%) |
| KGN | ~A$4.38 (Oct, low conf.) | ~A$440m | ~A$400m | 0.79x | 9.6x (adj.) | Not sourced |
| NCK | A$13.85 (11 Sep) | A$1.18b | A$1.43b | 2.77x | 8.1x | Not sourced |
| LOV | ~A$22.66 (Oct, low conf.) | ~A$2.5b | ~A$2.5b | 2.7x | ~16x EV/EBIT | Not sourced |
EV = market cap + debt – cash, BG Trading estimate. KGN and LOV share counts and prices are low confidence and should be checked before relying on them. Analyst consensus for TPW from StockAnalysis (September 2026).
Where TPW ranks: the fastest-growing on revenue after Lovisa in FY26, the weakest on margin by a wide distance, and the strongest balance sheet relative to its size. The single most important difference: TPW earns about 3 cents of EBITDA per dollar of sales, against 8 cents at Kogan and well over 15 cents at Nick Scali and Lovisa. The whole investment case is about closing part of that gap.
Is (ASX: TPW) Temple & Webster, undervalued or overvalued in comparison to its peers?
FAIRLY VALUED versus peers Inference.
- On EV/Revenue TPW is the cheapest of the group at 0.75x, a 73% discount to NCK (2.77x) and a 5% discount to KGN (0.79x).
- On trailing EV/EBITDA it is the most expensive at 22.9x, a 139% premium to KGN (9.6x) and 183% to NCK (8.1x).
- On FY27 guidance (13.7x), the premium to KGN narrows to about 43%, which is roughly what a 50% to 80% EBITDA growth rate should earn.
- Analyst upside of about 5% to the A$5.71 average target is small after the AGM rally.
The discount on sales is earned by the low margin, and the premium on earnings is only justified if FY27 guidance is delivered. Relative value and absolute value line up here: fair value in section 6, fair value against peers.
9 · Technical analysis (BG Trading view)
The selling is fading.
RSI after a 33% breakout day. The last two times it reached 70, the rally failed.
WATCHLIST- Primary trend: down. An 84% fall from about A$28.50 (August 2025). Price is far below the 200-day average (about A$8.39), which is still falling.
- Base: five months of sideways trade in a tight band (roughly A$4.10 to A$5.50) since May 2026, with the 20 and 50-day averages flattening and now below price.
- Breakout candle: +33.4% on AGM day to A$5.43, on about 3.6m shares, the highest volume since the August result. Price closed at the top of the base.
- RSI divergence: the RSI has made higher lows since February (rising support line) while price made lower lows, a classic sign that selling pressure is fading.
- RSI at 71, overbought: the last two times RSI reached 70 (June and August 2026), price failed and rolled over.
- Resistance: the August gap area, then the 200-day average. Support: the top of the base, then the base low.
Formation: base breakout attempt after a long decline, confidence MEDIUM Inference. The BGS 20 level sits below the current price, close to the base.
Probabilities are qualitative judgement, not statistical forecasts.
BGS 20 VIEW: Watchlist
Positioning: This area is only available for VIP Members, click here to Subscribe.
10 · Our view
Patience pays here.
BGS 20 Score. Business Quality 57, Setup Quality 58. A good company, a good stock and a good entry are three different questions.
WAITSuitability: AGGRESSIVE / TRADERS. Opportunity type: SWING TRADE with a SPECULATIVE POSITION option for patient investors.
| Category | Score | Weight | Weighted |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fundamentals | 55 | 15% | 8.25 |
| Growth | 45 | 10% | 4.50 |
| Balance Sheet | 85 | 10% | 8.50 |
| Valuation | 55 | 20% | 11.00 |
| Technical | 55 | 10% | 5.50 |
| Catalysts | 65 | 10% | 6.50 |
| Industry / Macro | 45 | 10% | 4.50 |
| Risk / Reward | 60 | 15% | 9.00 |
| Weighted total | 100% | 57.75 → 58 | |
| Reversal Watch (RSI divergence + volume breakout) | +5 | ||
| BGS 20 Score | 63/100 (SPECULATIVE band upper / MODERATE) |
Business Quality = (55×15 + 45×10 + 85×10 + 45×10) / 45 = 57. Setup Quality = (55×20 + 55×10 + 65×10 + 60×15) / 55 = 58. No caps applied. Biggest factor raising the score: the debt-free balance sheet. Biggest factor lowering it: contracting revenue in a weak consumer market.
BGS 20 Score: 63/100 (Business Quality 57, Setup Quality 58)
| Case | Assumption | Fair value / share |
|---|---|---|
| Bear | FY27 EBITDA A$30m x 11 + cash | ~A$3.94 |
| Base | FY27 EBITDA A$36.5m x 15 + cash | ~A$5.83 |
| Bull | A$40m x 18 + cash (FY28 growth credited) | ~A$7.33 |
BG Trading estimate. Cash A$123m, ~115m shares. Current Price vs Base Fair Value = (5.83 – 5.43) / 5.43 = +7.4%.
A good company in transition, a stock that has just woken up, and an entry that needs patience after a 33% day. To check with VIP Membership (potential trading setup).
Buy at the current price? Sign up for VIP membership to see this part.
- Biggest reason to own: a debt-free online leader guiding to 50% to 80% EBITDA growth, with 20% of its market cap in cash and an active buy-back.
- Biggest reason not to own: revenue is shrinking in a weak consumer market, and the margin story is still unproven over a full year.
- What invalidates the thesis: a break back into and through the base, or a 1H result that puts FY27 guidance at risk (exact levels in the VIP area).
- Most important catalyst: the 1H FY27 result in February 2027 and the revenue trend from late February.
- Driven by: catalysts and technicals first, valuation second.
- Asymmetric risk/reward: assessed in the VIP area.
- Technically discounted or fundamentally undervalued? Technically discounted (84% off the high); fundamentally close to fair value.
- Trade or investment? A trade first; an investment only once revenue growth returns.
One more thing
A reversal may be forming.
REVERSAL WATCHRSI has made higher lows for eight months while the price made lower lows, and the breakout came on the heaviest volume since August. We are watching for confirmation, not chasing the candle.
11 · VIP area
SHOULD I BUY (ASX: TPW) NOW?
ENTRY DETAILS, TRADING CONSIDERATIONS, TARGETS, SHAREHOLDER STATISTICS, HOLDING TREND (VIP AREA)
VIP Members only. Our entry price, targets, stop loss and shareholder statistics are for VIP Members.
Sources
- Temple & Webster FY26 Annual General Meeting presentation, 23 October 2026 (supplied by BG Trading)
- Temple & Webster FY26 results announcement, ASX, 19 August 2026
- The Bull: Why did Temple & Webster shares just add 33%?
- Rask Media: TPW sinks 16% on FY26 result
- Capital Brief: TPW jumps after reaffirming FY27 guidance
- StockAnalysis: TPW statistics and NCK statistics
- Kogan.com FY26 results, ASX, 24 August 2026
- Rask Media: Nick Scali FY26 result
- Ragtrader: Lovisa FY26 result
- InvestSMART: LOV and KGN share prices
Disclaimer. The information contained in this report is provided by BG Trading Australia (ACN 161943228, License 4901880) for general informational purposes only and does not constitute personal financial product advice. It has been prepared without taking into account your objectives, financial situation, needs, or risk tolerance, and should not be relied upon as a substitute for independent professional advice tailored to your circumstances. Nothing in this report constitutes an offer, solicitation, or recommendation to buy, sell, or hold any financial product.
All technical levels, targets, and commentary reflect a point-in-time interpretation of publicly available chart data and are inherently speculative; markets are volatile and unpredictable, and no methodology, including the BGS 20 framework, can guarantee any particular outcome. Past performance is not, and should not be treated as, an indicator of future performance. To the maximum extent permitted by law, BG Trading Australia, its directors, employees, and agents disclaim all liability, whether direct or indirect, for any loss or damage arising from reliance on this report, including any errors, omissions, or inaccuracies in the information provided, and any decision made or action taken on the basis of it. You acknowledge that trading and investing carry inherent risk, including the risk of loss of capital, and that you act on this information entirely at your own discretion and risk. BG Trading recommends you obtain independent, licensed financial and taxation advice before making any investment decision.
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